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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment (Acemoglu
et al., 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). The threat of expropriation by state or
non-state actors leads to inefficiently low investment in (contestable) productive
assets and inefficiently high investment in guard labour (Besley, 1995; Besley and
Ghatak, 2010). Where the state fails to develop a monopoly on violence, weak
property rights may lead to civil conflict.
In economic models, for conflict to be profitable two conditions must be satis-
fied. First, there must be something worth taking—the prize must be valuable.1
Second, it must be possible to take it—the prize must be contestable.2 For civil
conflict between non-state actors, the second condition captures the ability of the
state to enforce and protect property rights.
Much of the micro-oriented empirical conflict literature has focussed on the role
of the value of the prize (relative to the outside option).3 Consequently, despite a
prevailing view—backed by cross country evidence (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003)—
that weak institutions and ineffective states provide the necessary conditions for
conflict, we are still only beginning to unpack the role of specific policies and
institutions.
This paper provides evidence for one such institution. Using variation in the
municipal share of land with contestable title in the Brazilian Amazon, we show
that (in)secure property rights are strongly associated with (land related) conflict.
As in many developing countries (USAID, 2013), land related conflict is widespread
in the Brazilian Amazon. Between 1997 and 2010 at least 280 murders, and many
more lesser events are directly attributable to land disputes. Our results suggest
that weak property rights, and the resulting contestability of land title, is a primary
cause of this conflict. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, at the municipal
1A lower (opportunity) cost of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Chassang and Miquel, 2009),
is the flip side of a bigger prize, and would be expected to have the same effect.
2In models of conflict as contest functions (e.g. Grossman, 1991; Skaperdas, 1992; Hirshleifer,
1995; Fearon, 2008), contestability would speak to the mapping of conflict ‘effort’ into success.
3For the effect of shocks to the value of the outside option see e.g. Miguel et al. (2004); Hidalgo
et al. (2010); Vanden Eynde (2011); Ferrara and Harari (2013), for the value of the prize see e.g.
Dube and Vargas (2013); Berman and Couttenier (2013); Nunn and Qian (2014); Bazzi and Blattman
(2014). The results of Hidalgo et al. are of particular interest for this study: squatting increases in
Brazil when the value of the outside option is low.
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level, substantively all land related violence is due to insecure titling. However,
because our empirical strategy is a comparison across municipalities over time,
and much of the Amazon remains contestable, our results may not indicate large
falls in overall conflict. It is a possible that some conflict was diverted to places
where property rights remained insecure—our evidence will be suggestive of this.
Contestability of property rights over land is enshrined into the Brazilian con-
stitution. Land not in ‘productive use’ is vulnerable to invasion by squatters, who
can develop the land and appeal to the government for title.4 We proxy for the
amount of contestable land in a municipality by exploiting the expansion of eco-
logical and protected areas. Once land is protected, it fulfils the productive use
requirement, and is thus no longer contestable—even in the absence of economic
activity. We construct a new panel for 1997 to 2010, which provides the share of
land under protection for the 792 municipalities in the Amazon states. During this
period, the share of land under some sort of protection in these municipalities in-
creased markedly, from 16% to 44%, providing substantial variation in municipal
level availability of contestable land.
Because the placement of protected areas may be endogenous—indeed, many
protected areas were explicitly placed to prevent further encroachment along the
South East Amazon’s ‘arc of deforestation’—we develop a quasi-event study method-
ology that exploits variation in protection provided by individual protected areas
that span multiple municipalities. For the intuition behind this approach, consider
a protected area that straddles two municipalities, A and B, but covers a large por-
tion of A and a small portion of B. We compare the trajectory of violence in these
municipalities before and after the protected area is established. As property rights
are no longer contestable in a large portion of A, we would expect violence in A to
fall relative to B after establishment. Zooming in on the establishment of individ-
ual protected areas in this way substantially relaxes the identification assumption.
All that is required is that these neighbouring municipalities would have followed
parallel trends in land conflict if the areas had never been established. Because mu-
nicipalities are relatively small, neighbouring municipalities are similar in terms of
4Mandates that property must fulfil a ‘social function’ are common. See, for example, Arti-
cle 14 of Germany’s constitution. Similar provisions can be found in many European, and most
Latin American, constitutions. Under common law, laws relating to ‘Adverse Possession’ (squatters
rights) often perform a similar function.
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land endowments, distance to the Amazon frontier, enforcement and reporting
technology, and so provide a plausible counterfactual. This approach also allows
us to provide evidence in support of the key parallel trends assumption.
While land related conflict is strongly predicted by the availability of contestable
land, there is no detectable relationship with non-land related violence (proxied by
homicides). We also do not observe differential changes in economic activity or
an increase in environmental enforcement efforts (proxied by the number of fines
written for environmental infractions). The changes in land conflict do not appear
to have been a by-product of general changes in violence, the increased presence
of park rangers or differential effects on economic activity that establishing a pro-
tected area might entail.
We also provide suggestive evidence that other inputs into the production pro-
cess of land conflict increase. In order to gain land title, settlers must clear the land
and put it into productive use. Deforestation, and particularly permanent defor-
estation and agricultural conversion, is a key input into land conflict. Using high
resolution land cover data, we verify that protection is associated with an increase
in forest cover. We then use sequences of land cover data to provide evidence
that protection is particularly associated with falls in ‘permanent’ deforestation,
the type of deforestation associated with establishing title. Conversely, short run
deforestation of the type associated with illegal logging, single season pasture and
other temporary activities increases. These results are consistent with falls in set-
tler activity in protected areas, and suggest a mechanism by which protected areas
may have been successful in reducing deforestation despite limited enforcement.
This paper is most directly related to a recent literature exploring how specific
institutions and policies affect civil conflict. For instance, Fetzer (2013) explores
how social insurance can mitigate ‘opportunity cost’ type violence by providing
state-contingent payoffs in the event of adverse productivity shocks; Dell (2015)
shows that anti drug trafficking activities can create a power vacuum that con-
tribute to conflict between gangs; Bazzi and Gudgeon (2015) show how redistrict-
ing can reduce violence by reducing ethnic polarisation; and Vanden Eynde (2015)
demonstrates that governments respond to fiscal incentives by cracking down on
dissidents. By focussing on land property rights in the Brazilian Amazon, this pa-
per is closely related to Alston et al. (1999, 2000), which show that, in the cross
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section, the presence of settlers and a government agency that assists settlers in
claiming title are correlated with land conflict in Brazil. Our results complement
and improve on these findings by exploring the effect of property rights over land
in a robust empirical framework.
This paper is also related to the large literature exploring the microeconomics of
property rights with relation to credit (Besley, 1995; Field and Torero, 2006; Besley
et al., 2012), investment (Place and Hazell, 1993; Jacoby et al., 2002; Goldstein and
Udry, 2008) and, particularly, guard labour (Field, 2007). Unlike these papers, we
focus directly on the link between property rights and conflict—an essential im-
plicit ingredient in these papers. Our results suggest that, in addition to providing
economic benefits, secure property rights are an integral function of an effective
and peaceful state, and that even in the presence of a relatively well functioning
government, failure to secure and define monopoly rights can undermine the states
monopoly on violence. Moreover, they suggest that assigning property rights can
reduce conflict—even in the absence of additional enforcement.
Finally, the paper makes a contribution to a growing literature that demon-
strates how political and economic factors shape the demand for deforestation.
For instance, Burgess et al. (2012) suggest, that a rent extraction incentives of local
politicians drive deforestation in Indonesia; Assunc¸a˜o and Gandour (2013) sug-
gests that part of the recent decline in Amazon deforestation may be attributable
to a conditional rural credit program; Gandour (2013) shows that falls in the cost
of monitoring and enforcement, thanks to almost real-time deforestation data, may
have reduced Amazon deforestation dramatically. Our paper contributes to this lit-
erature by highlighting the unintended consequences of redistributive land reform
policies in driving deforestation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background
on land conflict, property rights and protected areas in Brazil. Section 3 provides
a brief description of the data and how it was constructed, with more detail pro-
vided in Online Appendix A. Section 4 provides the empirical strategy and results.
Section 5 concludes.
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2 Background
2.1 Land Ownership and Conflict
Land ownership in Brazil is highly concentrated. Just 3% of the population own
more than two-thirds of all arable land and land inequality is the highest of the
eighteen developing countries in Griffin et al. (2002). The high concentration of
land ownership is a lasting consequence of colonial land policy. Grants of large es-
tates to colonialists, under a system similar to feudalism, were later converted into
private holdings. Primogeniture ensured that land ownership did not fragment
over time. After independence, land could be purchased directly from the state or
through secondary markets, but for a long time, sales by the state were restricted
to the elite.
Perhaps in response to high levels of inequality, organisations in favour of land
reform, such as the Brazil Landless Rural Workers Movement, have become increas-
ingly popular and influential. The text of the current (and previous) constitutions
reflect this popular demand for land reform; requiring that land be adequately and
rationally used in order to fulfil its ‘social function’. If land is not adequately used,
it is vulnerable to invasion by squatters, who are able to appeal for use rights after
a year of productive use, and title after five years. The threshold for productive
use is vaguely defined (and varies across space), but in the Amazon it certainly
requires a significant share of land to be cleared.
The expropriation of land is managed by the National Institute of Colonisation
and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). To obtain title and use rights, squatters must apply
to INCRA. The extent of INCRA’s activities are limited by budgetary constraints—
chiefly the requirement that INCRA compensate incumbent landowners at ‘mar-
ket rates’. Nevertheless, since 1988, INCRA have settled over a million house-
holds on more than 75 million hectares of land. In many cases, squatting is an
entrepreneurial act. According to de Almeida and Campari (1996), settlers often
move ahead of the Amazon frontier, clear land and develop a legal claim, before ul-
timately selling the land to commercial ranchers as nearby infrastructure improves.
For these squatters, gaining title is central to their business model.
Despite the requirement that landowners be compensated for their loss, the
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involuntary nature of expropriations, and often inadequate level of compensation,
mean that land invasions have the potential to create conflict between squatters
and incumbent landowners. For instance, Schmink and Wood (1992) argues that
pioneer settlers’ lack of property rights makes them vulnerable to force used by
ranchers who also want to establish a claim to land. Of particular relevance to
the present study are Alston et al. (1999, 2000), which show that the presence of
INCRA, the agency which grants title to settlers, is strongly associated with more
violence in the cross section, suggesting that fear of losing title may exacerbate
conflict. However, because the presence of INCRA is endogenous to the presence
of settlers, and other factors associated with land conflict, it is not clear the extent
to which the relationship is causal or how important it is as an overall driver of
conflict.
2.2 Protected Areas in the Brazilian Amazon
The Amazon is among the last remaining ecosystems not subject to anthropogenic
changes. It is also a major carbon trap, absorbing 2.2 billion tons of CO2 each
year (Espı´rito-Santo et al., 2014). If climate change and biodiversity loss are to be
minimised, limiting Amazon forest loss will be crucial. Despite this, until rela-
tively recently, the prevailing view in Brazil was that the Amazon was a frontier to
be conquered and incorporated into the productive sector (Andersen et al., 2002;
Angelsen, 2010).
In recent years, Brazilian policy towards the Amazon has focussed on protection
rather than exploitation. The share of Amazon land that private landowners are
legally required to keep forested was increased to 80% in 1996 (with little imme-
diate impact). Large swathes of the Amazon have been designated as ecologically
or tribally protected.5 The establishment of the Brazilian Forestry Service (Servic¸o
Florestal Brasileiro) in 2006, improved satellite monitoring, and the blacklisting of
municipalities with excessive deforestation (Cisneros et al., 2015) have led to more
effective enforcement. Together, these policies seem to have substantially reduced
5While tribal protection does not de jure provide as stringent formal protection as some forms of
ecological areas, it does close the land to settlers and ranchers and curtail resource extraction. Nolte
et al. (2013) finds that tribal protection is more effective than ecological protection, suggesting that
the presence of tribes aid enforcement.
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the rate of deforestation; official (PRODES) figures indicate virgin forest loss de-
clined from around 13,000km2 in 1997 to 7,000km2 in 2010.6
Protection and Contestability. This paper will exploit a side effect of protection:
that when land is protected, title is effectively secured. This happens because when
land is protected for ecological purposes, it is automatically considered to satisfy its
‘social function’, even in the absence of economic activity. Land clearance no longer
provides squatters with a legal claim on the land, and hence protection ‘eliminates
the expectation of future possible legalisation of land tenure’ (Senior official in
charge of deforestation control cited in Abranches, 2013, p. 25). Similarly, when
land is tribally protected, indigenous groups are granted exclusive rights over land
use, although not underlying mineral rights, and claims by non-indigenous third
parties are annulled (Hutchison et al., 2006, p.13). At a municipal level then, an
increase in either indigenous or environmental protection represents a reduction in
the availability of land with contestable title.
In the results, we will show that falls in the amount of land with contestable
title in a municipality (via increases in protected area) are associated with rela-
tive declines in land related violence. Full details of the empirical strategies and
identification assumptions will be provided later. However, a discussion of how
protected areas are established will aid in understanding the threats to identifica-
tion and for interpreting our results.
Where gets Protected. Our empirical strategy will exploit the expansion of pro-
tected areas, and hence changes in the amount of land with insecure property
rights, to explore the effect of insecure property rights on violence. Understanding
how protected areas were placed will be crucial for the interpretation of the results,
as non-random placement will create the potential for bias.
The principle stated reason for ecological protection is the preservation of forest
and forest ecosystems (and most evidence suggests that they have been successful
in this, e.g. Laurance and Albernaz, 2002; Nepstad et al., 2006; Nolte et al., 2013).
However, because planners have used ecological (and most likely, economic, An-
6This overall trend disguises a sharp initial increase in deforestation to 2004, followed by an even
sharper subsequent decline.
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derson et al., 2015) criteria to decide where to place protected areas, they are not
likely to have been randomly assigned.
The principles underpinning the expansion of the system of ecologically pro-
tected areas were outlined in proposals emerging from the 1999 workshop on the
establishment of protected areas (Capobianco et al., 2001). Two principles were
emphasised: protected areas should constrain the advance of the Amazon frontier
and/or protect parts of the Amazon of particular ecological value. While specific
recommendations for the location of protected areas were not not closely followed,
the principles survived. New protected areas have encircled encroaching deforesta-
tion near the Amazon river and in the South-East Amazon (see figure 3).
The systematic placement of protected areas in the path of encroaching de-
forestation could downward bias our estimates of the effect of insecure property
rights on violence. As the frontier approached, land will have become more valu-
able, and hence more desirable to squatters and incumbent landowners, increasing
the intensity of conflict. On the other hand, if planners sought to minimise the eco-
nomic cost of protected areas, they may have been placed in relatively low value
locations, biasing our estimates upwards. To mitigate these types of bias, our pre-
ferred strategy will exploit variation only from neighbouring municipalities, where
underlying desirability is similar.
In some respects, the placement of indigenous areas is more straightforward:
they are historic tribal territories. The demarcation of Indian lands is the respon-
sibility Fundac¸a¨o Nacional do I´ndio (FUNAI), a Brazilian government agency re-
sponsible for Indian affairs. The process of demarcation is quite formalised, be-
ginning with an anthropological survey and ending with a presidential decree. In
practice, the establishment of tribal areas and their boundaries are frequently con-
tested (Hutchison et al., 2006) and incumbent landowners have sometimes been
successful in preventing, or at least delaying, the establishment of tribal lands.
As both ecological and indigenous areas both ultimately establish secure property
rights, we pool them in our main analysis.7
7The results in Online Appendix A2, where we show that both types of protected area have a
similar effect on conflict, support this pooling.
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Process of Environmental Protection. Since 2000, the creation of new protected
areas, and the status of existing areas, has been governed by Brazil’s National
System of Conservation Units (Crawford and Pignataro, 2007). Environmentally
protected areas fall into two main types, ‘Complete Protection’ and ‘Sustainable
Use’. The regulations for the creation of the areas, and exploitation of resource
within, differ by type. However, in all cases settlers are no longer able to develop a
claim on title by clearing land.
Before ecological protected areas of any kind can be established, a consultation
must be held with the local population and conservation experts. For indigenous
reserves, an ethnographic survey is carried out, which results in a proposal for
demarcation. Protected areas can be established by federal, state and municipal
governments, as well as by private landowners, although, in practice, the over-
whelming majority of protected areas are created by state or federal level govern-
ments. On establishment, for most types of reserve, any private land is subject to
compulsory purchase by government, in principle, at fair market value.8
While the precise formula for compensation is not clear, systematic deviations
from fair market value could lead to anticipatory effects on land related conflict, as
protected areas can be ‘proposed’ for many years before final approval. If compen-
sation was above (below) the market value of land, we would expect an increase
(decrease) in conflict in the run up to establishment. Because of this, we will later
be careful to document the absence of a significant anticipatory effect.
In addition to compensation for landowners, some states have implemented fis-
cal transfers to municipalities which provide ecological services (including having
land protected). Of the nine state which encompass the legal Amazon, five cur-
rently apportion some revenues in this way. For most municipalities these transfers
are a tiny portion of total revenues, so one would not expect a large effect on public
service provision. Nevertheless, in Online Appendix B.1, we show that our results
are robust to excluding municipalities that could ever have been eligible for these
types of transfers.
8For some types of sustainable use reserves, landowners may retain title if their plans for the
land are consistent with the rules governing that type of area. If not, government must purchase
the land at the prevailing rate.
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3 Data
The previous section suggested that insecurity of property rights could be an un-
derlying cause of land related conflict in the Brazilian Amazon; that deforesting
land may be a key way of obtaining title; and that protected areas may securely as-
sign property rights and hence reduce the scope for conflict. This section describes
the data on conflict, deforestation and protection used to explore the importance
of these things.
3.1 Conflict Data
We obtain data on land conflict from the annual reports of the Comissa˜o Pastoral da
Terra (CPT). The CPT was founded by the Catholic Church to highlight the plight
of landless workers, small farmers and squatters. Since 1985, it has published an
annual report on land related violence (Conflitos no Campo). This report includes
municipal level data on measures of land related conflict, including land related
murders, attempted murders, death threats, and other disputes.9
We link the data to the municipalities defined in the 2000 census. Because
Brazilian municipalities are occasionally subdivided, we assign violence data from
municipalities formed after 2000 to their parent municipalities. In the early 1990s,
municipality splitting was widespread, so, to maximise the number of comparable
units, we focus on years from 1997.
The CPT compile the data from local newspapers and reports from church or-
ganisations. As such, the data will inevitably understate the true level of conflict
and suffer from reporting error. To increase power, our principle outcome measures
will combine types of violent conflict together. To reduce measurement error, our
focus will be on the most extreme events. Our most inclusive measure, escalations,
combines murders, attempted murders and death threats. Our most preferred mea-
sure, violence, drops death threats to reduce the scope for reporting error. To ensure
our results are not driven by a few outlying observations, we also report results for
a dummified measure of violence (any violence). For reference, we also provide
our baseline results for each of the disaggregated measures of violence. Finally,
9Further information on the data, and details of how we constructed the panel, are provided in
Online Appendix A.1
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although not preferred, we present results based on the broadest measure of land
conflict published by the CPT, disputes, which captures disputes over land bound-
aries, irrigation and other such conflicts, and is hence most subject to reporting
error.
Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of violence (left) and escalations (right)
across Brazil for the period 1997-2010: violence was overwhelmingly concentrated
in the Amazon region, so we focus on municipalities in the Amazon states.10 Sum-
mary statistics are included in Table 1. Land related violence was a common occur-
rence in our sample: there were an average of 21 land related murders per year, a
similar number of land related attempted murders and many more death threats.
3.2 Protected Areas
To identify the expansion of protected areas in Brazil, we use digital maps detailing
the location and original boundaries of each protected area and the date the pro-
tected area was established. We combine this data with the 2000 census municipal
boundaries to produce a municipal level panel. The data allow us to calculate the
share of municipal land area that is protected for each year up to 2010. Details of
sources, and how the data were created, are provided in Online Appendix A.2.
There was a substantial increase in the share of the Amazon under ecological or
tribal protection over our sample period. Figure 1 plots the protected share of land
over time. In 1997 16% of the Amazon region was under protection, by 2010 44%
was. Figure 3 shows which areas were protected. Not surprisingly, protection was
concentrated in forested areas.
As both ecological and tribal protection effectively establish secure property
rights, we pool them in the main analysis. Nevertheless, in Online Appendix Table
A2 we provide our main results for indigenous and ecological areas separately;
they are very similar to the pooled results.
3.3 Forest Cover and Deforestation
Deforestation and agricultural conversion is the primary means of establishing le-
gal claim over land. Protected areas reduce the amount of land where title can
10Acre, Amazonas, Amapa, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Para, Rondonia, Roraima and Tocantins.
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be claimed and, in principle, increase the penalties associated with exploitation
of forest resources. This should reduce deforestation, but particularly—because
enforcement is weak—permanent deforestation, which is more associated with at-
tempts to gain or retain land title.
To explore the impact of protection on land use change we use MODIS land
cover data (Channan et al., 2014). MODIS classifies land cover into 19 categories, at
a 500m resolution, for each year since 2001. We collapse the 19 raw categories into
4 groups, ‘forest’ (MODIS categories 1-5), ‘shrubland’ and grassland, (6-10), ‘crop-
land’ (12 and 14), and ‘other’ (water and urban areas). In the Amazon region, 97%
of pixel-years are either forested, shrubland or cropland. We attach the MODIS
data, and a large quantity of other geographic data including information on pro-
tected status, to 793,928 randomly drawn coordinates and generate a coordinate
level panel of land cover data.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section, we first consider how the availability of land with contestable prop-
erty rights drives land related conflict in the Amazon. Our results will indicate
that, at the local level, substantively all land related violence appears to be a conse-
quence of weakly defined property rights. (Although, our results will also suggest
that at least some local conflict was diverted elsewhere.) We then turn to a key
input into land related conflict, land clearance, to provide suggestive corroborating
evidence of a decline in conflict by considering changes in land use patterns. We
show that while protection appears to reduce deforestation, it does so only by pre-
venting the permanent deforestation required to obtain and retain title—temporary
deforestation actually increases.
4.1 Contestable Land and Conflict
Panel Specification. We use two main empirical specification to explore how
poorly defined property rights contribute to land conflict in Brazil. The first is
based on the full panel of Amazon region municipalities. We estimate the follow-
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ing OLS specification:
Yijt = αi + γjt + βProtectedShareijt + eijt (1)
Where Yijt is some measure of land conflict, αi is a municipality fixed effect,
γjt is a state-by-time fixed effect. The inclusion of this rich set of fixed effects
non-parametrically controls for time invariant differences in municipal levels of
conflict, and state specific economic, cultural and policy changes over time. As
a consequence, this specification exploits only within state variation. As protec-
tion securely assigns property rights, the protected share of land provides a time
varying proxy for the municipal level (inverse) share of land with contestable title.
Panel Results. Columns 1-3 of Table 2 Panel A report results for our preferred
aggregated measures of violence: escalation, violence, and a dummy indicating vi-
olence > 0. For reference, columns 4-6 provide results for disaggregated measures
of violence. Column 7 contains results for all recorded disputes, including minor
incidents.
For each outcome, an increase in the share of land under protection—and hence
a decrease in the availability of contestable land—is associated with lower levels of
land conflict. The estimated effects are large, similar in magnitude (relative to the
mean), and are generally consistent with local conflict being completely driven by
poorly defined property rights. Two out of three of our preferred ‘aggregated vi-
olence’ measures, which maximise power, are significant at the 5% level. Not sur-
prisingly, disaggregating the measures of violence reduces statistical power, and
only the effect on attempted murders remains statistically significant (and this at
the 10% level). The effect on disputes, which may suffer from quite uneven report-
ing, is also insignificant.
To interpret these estimates as causal, we require that—conditional on the fixed
effects—the error term is uncorrelated with the share of protected land. In prac-
tice, this assumption has two components. First, that protection is assigned in an
‘as good as random’ fashion. Second, that the reporting of conflict is not itself
endogenous to the protected share of land. The first would be violated if, for ex-
ample, changes in protection and conflict were both consequences of an advancing
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Amazon frontier (the distance of the forest from undeveloped land). The second
would be violated if, for example, protected areas made local newspapers differ-
ently interested in land related issues.
We can reassure ourselves somewhat by exploring the extent to which the es-
timated effect of secure property rights changes when estimated under different
specifications. In Online Appendix Table A1, we provide results for specifications
with less demanding time fixed effects and/or municipality specific time trends.
In each case the estimated coefficients are similar, mitigating concerns over the
presence of geographically correlated shocks or differential municipal trends.
Quasi-Event Study Specification. Despite the robustness of the results to changes
in specification, concerns over whether the documented relationship is a causal one
must remain. To help establish causality, we refine our approach, and significantly
relax the identification assumption, by exploiting the geographic features of the
data.
The intuition behind this ‘quasi-event’ approach is straightforward. Many pro-
tected areas have boundaries which span more than one protected area. We think
of each of these protected areas as an event that treats all intersecting municipal-
ities. These municipalities are not, however, treated equally, and the intensity of
treatment varies depending on how much of the municipality is protected. Figure
4 illustrates the approach. The blue areas are four municipalities that are treated by
the red protected area: while almost 1/3 of Monte Alegre’s land area is protected,
only a small share of Obidos’ is.
The dataset for the quasi-event study approach is constructed as follows. For
each protected area, we identify the set of municipalities where some land is newly
protected. We calculate treatment intensity for each municipality, by calculating
the share of municipal land protected by that specific area.11 The conflict data is
added, and the dataset stacks the set of municipality-year observations for all pro-
tected areas.12 With this data, we estimate the following difference-in-differences
11For consistency with our panel results, we define intensity as the share of land in the municipal-
ity that is newly protected by the particular protected area. However, very similar results (modulo
scaling effects) are obtained if treatment intensity is defined as the share of unprotected land area
protected (see Online Appendix table A3).
12Because some municipalities contain parts of more than one protected area the same munici-
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specification
Yikt = αik + γkt + βPost× ShareProtectedit + eikt (2)
where αik is a municipality-by-protected area fixed effect and γkt is a protected
area-by-time fixed effect.
The identification assumption is that of parallel trends: in the absence of the
establishment of the protected area, changes in conflict in municipalities more af-
fected by the protected area would not have been different to less affected neigh-
bouring municipalities. The demanding set of fixed effects employed mean we are
exploiting only variation that exists within sets of municipalities sharing common
protected areas (like the four illustrated in figure 4). On average, protected areas
(or expansions of protected areas) that span more than one municipality intersect
with 2.98 municipalities. There are 209 protected areas of this type in our data.
Because municipalities are small, the areas we are zooming in on are extremely
similar geographically, and are much more likely to have comparable data report-
ing quality due to the presence of shared local media and church groups. One
weakness of this approach is that, to the extent that land invasions are diverted to
nearby municipalities, the results will overstate the impact of well defined prop-
erty rights on land related conflict.13 Indeed, we will present evidence suggestive
of exactly this type of diversionary effect.
Quasi-Event Study Results. Table 2 Panel B contains the results. They are broadly
consistent with those estimated in the panel setting: clearly assigning property
rights dramatically reduces land related conflict. The estimated coefficients are
larger (in absolute terms) than those estimated in the panel specification, suggest-
ing that either some of the effect of protection is to divert conflict into nearby
unprotected areas or that protected areas tend to be placed in areas where conflict
would otherwise increase (like the Amazon frontier). Later results will be indica-
tive of both effects. Coefficients on our preferred aggregate outcomes are significant
pality can appear in the data more than once. To obtain consistent standard errors in spite of this
constructed auto-correlation, we two-way cluster our errors at both the municipality and ‘protected
area’ level.
13While the basic panel specification is also likely to suffer from this, the effects are greatly
exacerbated by using only neighbouring municipalities as controls.
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at the 5% level or better, while those on disaggregated measures are significant at
at least the 10% level.
It is impossible to directly verify whether the parallel trends assumption re-
quired for a causal interpretation of the coefficients would have held in the absence
of the establishment of protected areas. We can, however, evaluate whether parallel
trends held before establishment. To this end, we estimate coefficients on the area
protected by specific protected areas for the seven years surrounding establishment:
Yikt = αik + γkt +
3
∑
s=−2
βs (ShareProtectedi × 1[TimeToProtection = s]) + eikt (3)
Here, the βs captures the correlation between the share of land to be protected
and violence in the years before and after the introduction of the protected area.
We focus on protected areas where outcome data is available for at least three
years before and after establishment, and drop observations outside this seven-
year window—each coefficient is estimated on a consistent set of protected areas.
The coefficients for our three main measures are plotted in figure 5. Not surpris-
ingly, the estimated coefficients on each year are not generally significant. However,
for each measure of violence the pattern is clear. There were no differential trends
in violence before or after the establishment of the protected area, but there was a
pronounced fall in violence around the time of establishment. Because landowners
are compensated for conversion of land to protected status, conflict over land rights
continues right up to demarcation.
The large effect size we observe when zooming into neighbouring municipali-
ties suggests that securing property rights in one location may lead to conflict in
nearby locations. One natural question is, how far do these local spillovers ex-
tend? To explore this, we re-estimate our event study specification, but expand
the ‘control’ region, by first adding the municipalities adjacent to the intersecting
municipalities, first degree adjacency, and then second, adding the municipalities
that are adjacent to the adjacent municipalities, second degree adjacency. We also
re-estimate our panel specification with a variable indicating the share of land that
is unprotected but less than 10km from the boundary of a protected area.
Table 3 contains these results. Panel A contains the panel results, the estimated
coefficients on the share of land within 10km of a protected area are suggestive of
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local spillovers, but the coefficients are imprecisely estimated and not statistically
significant.14 Panels B and C extend the event study control region to first and
second degree adjacent municipalities. The estimated coefficients halve in absolute
size in both specifications. There may be significant local redirection of violence,
but the effect declines relatively rapidly with distance. This is consistent with ei-
ther the majority of the redirection taking place over relatively short distances, or
with many settlers not having strong preferences over location. Given the coor-
dinating role played by organisations such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem
Terra, which help direct settlers to suitable locations and coordinate large groups of
settlers, we should not discount the latter possibility. These diversionary effects of
local property rights on conflict are consistent with the negative externalities asso-
ciated with mafia protection of property rights (Bandiera, 2003) and the dislocating
effects of anti drug-trafficking activity (Dell, 2015).
Effects through other channels? We argue that the changes in land related con-
flict observed are due to decline in the availability of contestable land. However,
if the establishment of protected areas was associated with improved policing,
changes in economic activity, or more environmental enforcement, then this could
suggest other factors at work. In Table 4 we document that this does not appear to
have been the case.
Columns 1 and 2 indicate that there was no statistically significant effect on
either homicides in general, or homicides of indigenous persons in particular, and
the estimated coefficients are of opposite sign. These results do not indicate an
accompanying improvement in general law and order. (Unfortunately, data on
other crimes are not available at the municipal level.)
Columns 3 and 4 indicate no statistically significant effect on fines levied by the
environmental protection agency (IBAMA). Fines levied in the Amazon typically
sanction violations of the forest code. The vast majority of the fines are never col-
lected, though the fact fines are levied is suggestive of the degree of state presence.
We distinguish between the total number of fines and the number of fines classified
as ‘flora’ violations (which constitute 75% of all fines in the Amazon). Notably, and
14The average municipality has 13% of land within 10km of a protected area, compared to 20%
inside one. Other sized buffer regions had similar inconclusive effects (not reported).
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despite statistical insignificance, the estimated effect in the panel specification is
large and positive compared to the mean, whereas in the event-study specification
it is relatively small and negative. This difference is consistent with the Brazilian
governments stated policy of placing protected areas to encircle encroaching defor-
estation (and, consequently, with our panel estimates of the effect of protection on
conflict likely being too small in absolute terms).
Columns 5 and 6 indicate no statistically significant effects on either municipal
GDP, or municipal agricultural GDP. Protection is not accompanied by significant
economic changes. As with enforcement, the estimated coefficients are positive in
the panel specification and negative in the quasi-event specification, which is again
suggestive of protected areas being placed to constrain encroaching deforestation.15
In section 2, we noted that some states provide fiscal transfers to municipal gov-
ernments based on the amount of land under protection. We show that our results
are not driven by these transfers in Online Appendix Section B.1. From 2007 some
municipalities were ‘blacklisted’ on the basis of poor performance in environmen-
tal protection, one consequence of which is that there was greater subsequent focus
on deforestation and land policy in these municipalities. In Online Appendix Table
A5, we show that our results are robust to excluding these counties. Lastly, Alston
et al. (1999, 2000) emphasise the crucial role of INCRA in facilitating land conflict
and property rights uncertainty. In Online Appendix Section B.2, we show that our
results are not driven by an association with protection and INCRA activities.
4.2 Protection, Deforestation and Patterns of Land Use Change
As we have seen, weakly defined property rights appear to be an important con-
tributory factor to Brazil’s high levels of land related conflict. As discussed in
section 2, clearing land is a key way settlers establish property rights and a key
way landowners can prevent expropriation. Thus, we would expect increases in
land conflict to be accompanied by increased deforestation (and vice versa). In
this section we show that protection is associated with decreased deforestation. Of
course, despite anecdotal evidence that land title, rather than farmland, is often the
15Given that protection is intended to limit economic exploitation of the forest, the true effect
ought to be weakly negative.
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principal aim of settlers (de Almeida and Campari, 1996), and that South Amer-
ican deforestation is driven overwhelmingly by land conversion and not logging
(Ferretti-Gallon and Busch, 2014), protection may also discourage deforestation re-
sulting from other motivations.
However, while a fall in settler activity would be expected to reduce deforesta-
tion on aggregate, it is particularly expected to reduce permanent deforestation.
Logging (both illegal and legal) and short term pasturing often result in only tem-
porary deforestation. Settlers as well as landowners need to clear forest in order to
maintain ‘productive use’. The different types of resource exploitation should re-
sult in distinctive land cover change patterns. We provide evidence consistent with
this hypothesis: while protected areas substantially reduce the incidence of ‘perma-
nent’ deforestation, we observe an increase in temporary deforestation. Protected
areas appear to discourage long term settlers, plausibly by removing the possibility
of gaining land tenure, while low enforcement capacity limits the extent to which
they can prevent illegal loggers, and short term ranchers.16
Protection and Forest Cover. We estimate the effect of protection on forest cover
in a ‘long difference’ specification. The unit of observation is a coordinate c. We
drew a random sample of 793,928 coordinates from across the Amazon and at-
tached them to the land cover and protected area data described in section 3. We
compare changes in forest cover Ftci between 2001-2010 to changes in protected sta-
tus, using both matched and unmatched samples. Our baseline estimating equation
is
∆Fci = γi + β× ∆ProtectedAreaci + eci (4)
Where ∆Fci = F2010ci − F2001ci and Ftci is a dummy indicating whether a coordinate is
forested at time t. We include coordinate and either state or municipality γi fixed
effects, so we are exploiting only within-state or within-municipality variation.
Table 5 columns 1 and 2, contain the unmatched estimates. In practice, we
only observe transitions from unprotected to protected status. Coordinates that
16For example, on average there is just one warden for every 1872km2 of protected area (p.
35, Verı´ssimo, 2011), and the majority of protected areas are managed inadequately (Onaga and
Drumond, 2007).
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are protected are around 1 percentage point more likely to remain forested (or
become reforested) than coordinates whose protection status does not change. This
is around half the baseline rate of deforestation. The estimates are significant at the
1% level.
Because protection is not randomly assigned, it is possible that selection into
protected status is biasing the results. As with conflict, it is not clear what the
expected direction of bias should be. If areas are protected because they were very
remote, and had low economic value, we would expect the estimates to overstate
the effectiveness of protected areas in reducing deforestation. Conversely, if areas
are protected because they are at immediate risk of deforestation, the estimated
effectiveness of protected areas would be understated. To mitigate these types
of bias, we provide additional results for a matched subsample of coordinates. We
match (without replacement) coordinates whose protection status changes between
2001 and 2010 (treated coordinates) with coordinates whose protected status never
changes (control coordinates) based on their propensity score, or estimated proba-
bility of being in each group. We retain observations where the absolute difference
in propensity score between the matched pairs is less than 0.001.17
Propensity scores are estimated with probit using a large number of geographic
and economic inputs. Online Appendix table A9 contains the results of the match-
ing regression. Coordinates whose protection status changed tended to be at in-
termediate distances from human habitation (as proxied by distance from night-
lights), closer to rivers, further north-west, and be expected to have relatively high
value agricultural yields. On this basis, it is unclear whether we should expect
protected areas to be more or less at risk from deforestation. Nevertheless, sum-
mary statistics in Table 1 highlight that the average coordinate that was protected
between 2001 and 2010 is quite different from the average unprotected coordinate;
88% of coordinates in our matched sample are forested, while just 68% are in the
full sample.
Table 5 columns 3 to 6, contain the matched sample estimates. If anything, pro-
tection is associated with a slightly larger reduction in deforestation in the matched
sample. The average rate of deforestation in the matched sample is much lower
17We show that the results are robust to other choices of thresholds in Online Appendix Tables
A10 and A11.
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than the unmatched sample, and the coefficients indicate that forest cover actu-
ally increased in protected areas. In columns 5 and 6 we also include matched-pair
fixed effects, which allow for non-parametric differential trends by propensity score
and increase precision. The matched estimates are significant at the 1% level. Our
findings that protection reduces deforestation are consistent with those of previous
studies (e.g. Nepstad et al., 2006; Nolte et al., 2013).
Temporary or Permanent Deforestation? While not definitively causal, protec-
tion is robustly associated with lower levels of deforestation. Given limited enforce-
ment capacity—and no observed increase in enforcement activities after protected
areas are established—this is in some sense surprising. However, our conflict re-
sults suggest that by removing the possibility of claiming title, protected areas may
have reduced the total economic returns to deforestation, even in the absence of
strict enforcement.
To claim title, farms must be established and land cleared. However, other uses
of the forest, such as logging and short term pasture, do not require permanent
deforestation. At the margin, protected areas may discourage permanent defor-
estation with the aim of obtaining title and encourage other short term land use.
These potential behavioural changes are hard—if not impossible—to measure
using standard economic data. Hence, we infer different types of land use by
studying longer sequences of land use. As a baseline, we classify land use into
sequences of length 5. As described in Section 3.3, in a given year a coordinate
can be forested F, shrubland S, or cropland C. Four sample sequences could be
FFFFF, FSSFF, CCCSC, and FCCCC. The first would represent a coordinate that
is permanently forested, the second a coordinate that was temporarily deforested,
while the third and fourth are consistent with permanent deforestation. There are
243 possible sequences of length five, of which 242 are observed in the data.
To avoid a highly subjective classification of each individual sequence, we use
a common machine learning method—k-means clustering—to classify the set of
possible sequences into (six) groups of ‘similar’ sequences using the algorithmic
implementation by Hartigan and Wong (1979). We then manually classify each of
these groups of sequences as either permanently forested, temporarily deforested
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or permanently deforested.18 In addition to removing the human factor from the
classification of individual sequences, one advantage of this approach is that we
can use the same criteria for sequences of any length, and we show that our results
are not specific to picking sequences of length 5 in Online Appendix Table A12.
Classifying land use sequences in this way allows us to study the potential be-
havioural changes at the margin relevant for understanding the results of reduced
land related conflict.
The MODIS land cover data covers 2001-2012, so we focus on two five year
periods 2001-05 and 2008-12. As before we estimate a differenced specification
(comparable to equation 4) including state fixed effects, so we exploit only within
state variation. Our outcome variables are differenced sequences i.e. ∆Sci =
S2008−12ci − S2001−05ci , where Stci is a dummy indicating permanent forest cover or
temporary deforestation or permanent deforestation. Our differenced protection
measure takes the difference between protection status in 2001 and 2008, the first
year of each of the five year sequences, rather than between 2001-10.19 As there are
two periods, this specification is equivalent to a standard panel specification with
coordinate and state-by-time fixed effects.
The results are contained in Table 6. Columns 1-3 contain results estimated in
the full panel of coordinates. Columns 4-6 on the matched set of coordinates.20
Regardless of the sample, the results are striking. Protection decreases the proba-
bility of permanent deforestation by roughly 1 percentage point (somewhat more
in the unmatched data, less in the matched data) and this change is significant at
the 5% level or greater in both the matched and unmatched samples. This decrease
in permanent deforestation is offset by increases in the share of sequences indicat-
ing temporary deforestation and permanent forestation of roughly equal size. Half
the area that was not permanently deforested was instead subject to temporary
deforestation. In the full sample these estimates are significant at at least the 5%
level, but only the effect on temporary deforestation is significant (at the 5% level)
18A full description of this how we implement this classification is provided in Online Appendix
A.3.
19The results are robust to differencing by other years, see Online Appendix Table A14.
20For consistency with the results of Table 5, we use the same set of matched coordinates. Note
however, that not all coordinates whose protection status change between 2001-10, will have their
protection status change between 2001-08.
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in the matched sample. Compared to the baseline probability of being temporarily
or permanently deforested in the matched sample the estimated effects are large.
Protection increases the probability of a sequence being temporarily deforested by
around 1/3 of the mean, and reduces the probability of permanent deforestation
by around 8% of the mean.
Put together, these results suggest that protected areas reduce deforestation,
and that they do so by discouraging permanent deforestation. Indeed, consis-
tent with the weak enforcement of protected areas, temporary deforestation ac-
tually increases suggesting some substitutability between types of forest exploita-
tion. Given the empirical specification, these results are suggestive rather than
definitive. Nevertheless, this pattern is consistent with the idea that protected area
reduce deforestation by eliminating the possibility of gaining land title through
forest clearance—exactly what one would expect given the effect of protection on
violence.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that insecure property rights are an important force
behind Brazil’s high levels of land related conflict. We exploited the fact that, at
the municipal level, expansion of protected areas reduces the amount of land with
contestable title. Regardless of specification, municipalities with less contestable
land experienced less land related violence. There was no evidence of accompany-
ing changes in enforcement, non-land related homicides, or prosperity. The setting
thus provided a unique opportunity to study the effect of property rights on con-
flict holding other factors constant. To highlight the mechanism, we showed that
protected areas reduce deforestation, but only permanent deforestation—the type
of deforestation associated with land related conflict—with temporary deforesta-
tion actually increasing. This paper contributes to an emerging literature which
explores the effect of specific policies and institutional factors on civil conflict and
begins to unpack the robust cross-country correlation between civil conflict and
weak institutions.
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Figure 1: Share of land in the Amazon states under ecological or tribal protection
30
Figure 2: Municipality level counts of escalations (left) and violence (right) over 1997 to 2010: land related conflict was
concentrated in the Amazon states (shaded). Violence is the sum of land related murders and attempted murders,
escalations adds death threats.
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A. Protected Areas in 1997 B. Protected Areas in 2010
Figure 3: Figures illustrating the expansion of protected areas between 1997 and 2010. The Amazon states are shaded.
Forested areas are darkened.
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Figure 4: Illustrates the intuition for the quasi-event study specification: we compare municipalities that are differ-
ently treated by the same protected area. Here, the blue area is the four municipalities that intersect, and are hence
treated by, the red protected area. The red protected area does not treat each municipality equally—Monte Alegre
is much more affected then Obidos—and the quasi-event study exploits this differential intensity of treatment and
compares conflict before and after the protected area was established.
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Escalation Violence Any Violence
Figure 5: Conflict before and after the establishment of protected areas. The vertical line indicates the introduction
of a protected area. The blue line plots OLS estimates of the interaction between the time to the introduction of
protected area and the share of the municipality protected. Estimates obtained using the quasi-event specification
with a balanced panel of protected areas covering the seven years surrounding the introduction of the protected
area. Dotted lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. Errors two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area
levels.
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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics
Mean s.d. N
Municipality Level Land Conflict Variables
Escalations 0.173 1.141 11,088
Violence 0.045 0.38 11,088
Violence Dummy 0.024 0.153 11,088
Murders 0.026 0.247 11,088
Attempted Murders 0.019 0.229 11,088
Death Threats 0.128 0.993 11,088
Disputes 0.315 1.114 11,088
Other Municipal Variables
Homicides for any Reason (all) 6.479 32.35 11,088
Homicides for any Reason (Indigenous) 0.030 0.286 11,088
Environmental Fines Issued (count all) 12.655 42.13 11,088
Environmental Fines Issued (count flora) 9.548 35.023 11,088
Log GDP (1999-2010) 10.918 1.264 9,504
Log Agricultural GDP (1999-2010) 9.572 1.114 9,504
Protected Share of Land (1997) 0.155 0.277 792
Protected Share of Land (2010) 0.243 0.328 792
Coordinate Level Data
Forested (2001-2010) 0.683 0.465 7.93m
... if matched sample 0.878 0.327 1.67m
Shrubland (2001-2010) 0.239 0.427 7.93m
... if matched sample 0.083 0.276 1.67m
Cropland (2001-2010) 0.049 0.216 7.93m
... if matched sample 0.017 0.128 1.67m
Protected (2001) 0.225 0.417 0.79m
Protected (2010) 0.437 0.496 0.79m
Coordinate Level Level Use Sequences (2001-2005 and 2008-2012)
Sequence Indicates Permanently Forested 0.686 0.464 1.58m
... if matched sample 0.886 0.317 0.33m
Sequence Indicates Temporary Deforestation 0.028 0.165 1.58m
... if matched sample 0.016 0.127 0.33m
Sequence Indicates Temporary Deforestation 0.286 0.452 1.58m
... if matched sample 0.098 0.297 0.33m
Land Conflict and Other Municipal data provided for the 792 municipalities in
the Amazon states for 1997-2010 (unless otherwise indicated). Land conflict data
from the CPT. Escalation is the sum of land related murders, attempted murders
and death threats. Violence is the sum of murders and death threats, and hence
captures serious violence. Disputes captures total the number of land related
disagreements for a variety of reasons. Homicide data is from the Mortality Infor-
mation System. Environmental fines are from IBAMA. GDP data is from IBGE.
The Protected Share of Land is the share of a municipality that is under ecological
or indigenous protection. Coordinate level land cover data are dummies based
on groupings of MODIS classifications as described in Section 3.3. Coordinate
level sequences are dummies based on grouping of sequences of landcover data
as described in Online Appendix Section A.3.
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Table 2: Protection and Land Related Conflict in the Amazon States
Aggregated Violence Disaggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Murders Attempts Threats Disputes
A. Panel Regression Results
Protected Share -0.208 -0.071** -0.047** -0.020 -0.051* -0.137 -0.183
(0.139) (0.035) (0.020) (0.018) (0.026) (0.131) (0.172)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .0257 .0195 .128 .315
N 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipalities 792 792 792 792 792 792 792
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event Study Results
Protected Share -0.605*** -0.156** -0.097** -0.070* -0.085** -0.449** -0.773***
(0.233) (0.063) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.200) (0.183)
Mean of DV .332 .0977 .0474 .0595 .0382 .234 .406
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98
Municipalities 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Protected Areas 209 209 209 209 209 209 209
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722 8722 8722 8722
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on outcome measures indicating land related conflict in the Amazon
states. Outcome data is from the annual Conflitos no Campo Brasileiro publication. Data covers 1997-2010. Panel A
presents results for the municipality level balanced panel. Panel B presents the results from the quasi-event study speci-
fication. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level (panel A) and two-way clustered at the municipality and
protected area levels (panel B). Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Some Violence May be Diverted to Nearby Areas
Aggregated Violence Other
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel Estimation
Protected Share -0.211 -0.072** -0.047** -0.177
(0.140) (0.035) (0.020) (0.171)
0 < DTPA < 10km 0.040 0.014 0.008 -0.092
(0.070) (0.022) (0.011) (0.149)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event (plus 1st degree adjacent municipalities)
Protected Share -0.314* -0.044 -0.029 -0.317**
(0.171) (0.036) (0.020) (0.150)
Mean of DV .299 .0884 .0424 .378
Observations 43064 43064 43064 43064
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
C. Quasi-Event (plus 2nd degree adjacent municipalities)
Protected Share -0.315** -0.068* -0.041** -0.275
(0.124) (0.038) (0.020) (0.185)
Mean of DV .296 .0871 .0415 .368
Observations 108654 108654 108654 108654
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on outcome measures indicating land
related conflict in the Amazon states. Outcome data is from the annual Conflitos no
Campo Brasileiro publication. Data covers 1997-2010. Panel A provides estimates based
on our panel specification. (0 < DTPA ≤ 10km) is the share of land in a municipal-
ity that is within 10km. The average municipality year observation has 13% of it’s land
within 10km of a protected area (compared to an average of 20% of land actually under
protection. Panel B estimates the quasi-event study specification including municipali-
ties adjacent to the municipalities intersecting each protected area as additional controls.
Panel C also includes municipalities adjacent to these adjacent municipalities. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level (panel A) and two-way clustered at the
municipality and protected area levels (panels B and C). Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Protection Not Accompanied by Changes in Total Homicide Rates,
Environmental Enforcement or Municipal Output
Homicides Enviro. Fines Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Indigenous All Flora GDP Ag. GDP
A. Panel Regression Results
Protected Share -3.578 0.044 9.861 5.900 0.019 0.062
(3.456) (0.052) (6.406) (5.420) (0.063) (0.111)
Mean of DV 6.48 .0301 12.7 9.55 10.9 9.57
Municipalities 792 792 792 792 792 792
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088 9504 9504
Muncipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event Study Results
Protected Share -3.144 0.073 -5.316 -6.567 -0.009 -0.040
(2.046) (0.078) (5.274) (4.693) (0.071) (0.144)
Mean of DV 7.38 .101 23.8 17.9 11.3 9.81
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98 2.98
Municipalities 285 285 285 285 285 285
Protected Areas 209 209 209 209 209 209
Observations 8722 8722 8722 8722 7476 7476
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating protected status to various municipal
level outcome measures. Data on municipal level homicides is from the Mortality Information Sys-
tem (1997-2010). Data on environmental fines was obtained from IBAMA (1997-2010), the outcome
variable is a count of either the total number of fines issued, or the number of fines relating to flora
offences. Data on local GDP from IBGE (1999-2010). As GDP data is only available from 1999 there
are fewer observations. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level (panel A) and two-
way clustered at the municipality and protected area levels (panel B). Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 5: Protection and Changes in Forest Cover
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Newly Protected 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.014***
Between 2001 and 2010 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
N 793928 793928 167336 167237 167336 167142
Mean of DV -.026 -.026 -.0059 -.00587 -.0059 -.00589
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Matched Pair FE Yes Yes
Matched Observations Only Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes is protected status to
changes in forest cover. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazil-
ian Amazon. The dependent variable is a categorical variable indicating whether the coor-
dinate was reforested (1), deforested (-1), or had no change in forest cover status (0). For
columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010 are matched to ob-
servationally identical coordinates that were either never protected or always protected on
the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9 for the matching regression).
We retain only matched pairs with absolute differences in propensity score of less than 0.001.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
Table 6: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0226 -.00313 -.00412 .00725
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Observations Only Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes in protected status to changes in land
use sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Amazon. We
drop coordinates which fall in urban areas or water. Two five year sequences are used for each coordinate,
2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land use sequences are categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporar-
ily deforested and permanently deforested, using the approach described in A.3. The dependent variable
is a categorical variable which takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular classification.
The independent variable indicates whether the coordinate was protected between 2001 and 2008 (the first
year of each five year sequence). For columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010
are matched to observationally identical coordinates that were either never protected or always protected
on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9 for the matching regression). We retain
only matched pairs with absolute differences in propensity score of less than 0.001. We match on changes
between 2001 and 2010 for consistency with table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Online Appendices
(Not necessarily for publication.)
A Data Appendix
A.1 Building the Municipality Level Conflict Panel
We obtain data on land conflict from the Annual Reports of the Comissao Pastoral
da Terra (CPT). The CPT was founded by the Catholic Church to highlight the
plight of landless workers, small farmers and squatters. Since 1985, it has published
an annual report on Conflitos no Campo (Violence in the Countryside). The report
includes a multitude of conflict measures. We focus on the set of conflict measures
that have been reported consistently between 1997 and 2010. The variables are
‘Disputes’, ‘Murders’, ‘Attempted Murders’ and ‘Death threats’. We discuss how
each variable is constructed in turn.
Disputes This is a general measure of land conflicts and ongoing (legal) disputes
between individuals or legal entities claiming title to land. These were contained
in the original documents under the headings ‘Conflitos por Terra’ from 1997-2004
and ‘Areas em conflito’ from 2004-2010. Under the heading land conflicts are sub-
sumed all incidences relating to ‘land conflict’, which are broadly defined as actions
to resist and confront the possession, use and ownership of land when involving
squatters, settlers of, quilombos (descendants of freed slaves), colonisers, small
leaseholders, small proprietors, occupiers, landless and rubber tappers. Through-
out, the CPT records a conflict in a given year if that conflict broke out in that year;
old and unresolved conflicts are only included in a given report if there has been a
significant event relating to it.
For each conflict, we have the following information:
• State
• Municipality Name
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• Name of conflict, typically relating to the name of a farm or location descrip-
tion.
• Date of dispute recorded
• Area in dispute (often missing)
• Number of families affected (often missing)
Murders, Attempted Murders and Death Threats Throughout the time period,
we have data for Murders (Assassinatos), Attempted Murders (Tentativas de As-
sassinato) and Death Threats (Ameacados de Morte). For each event, we have the
following information.
• State
• Municipality name
• Name of conflict
• Date of event
• Name of victim
• Age of victim (often missing)
• Category of victim, e.g. land less, occupier, fisherman, indigenous, rural
labourer (often missing)
We create a variable called ‘Escalations’, which combines Murders, Attempted
Murders and Death Threats into a single time-varying measure at the municipality
level, and a variable called ‘Violence’ which combines Murders and Attempted
Murders.
Matching to 2000 Census Municipalities We use the 2013 shapefile of adminis-
trative boundaries for Brazilian municipalities to provide a gazetteer of municipal-
ity names for the states in the Amazon states. This can be thought of as the most
extensive list of municipality names, as when a municipality splits, one usually
retains the name of the original municipality. While there have been a signifi-
cant number of municipality splits in the early 1990s, few new municipalities were
created since 2000. We match conflict events to municipalities performing fuzzy
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string matching on the set of municipality names within the state in which the con-
flict event was recorded. This creates a mapping matching conflict events to 2013
municipality names. We then build a cross walk to match 2013 municipalities to
municipalities in the 2000 census shapefile. We use this to build a balanced panel
across 792 municipalities in the Amazon states for the period 1997-2010 for the
conflict variables described above.
A.2 Construction of Protected Area Data
Data on protected areas was produced by combining digital maps from several
sources. The principle source was the UN World Database of Protected Areas. This
database provide a digital map outlining the original extent ecologically protected
areas in Brazil created up to 2007 and tribally protected areas designated up to
2010.
To calculate the area in a municipality under protection in say 2003, we simply
calculate the total area in a municipality covered by one or more protected areas
established up to (and including) 2003. For around 3% of reserves, data on the
start date is missing. We assume these reserves came into existence prior to 1997
(i.e. before the start of our panel). For some of the reserves, we have been able to
verify that this was indeed the case, but to the extent that some were established
subsequently, this assumption introduces measurement error into our protected
area data.
We supplement the data on ecological areas with data from the Brazilian Min-
iste`rio do Meio Ambiente (Environment Ministry). Despite being based on the
same underlying set of polygons, the Environment Ministry data includes the ex-
tent of protected areas in 2014, rather than their original extents. This means that if
a new protected area X supersedes part of an existing protected area, following the
procedure used on the UN data would mean we would erroneously assign land to
unprotected status for the years up to the establishment of X. We try to minimise
this by using the UN data to provide a baseline extent of protection in 2007. So, for
2008, we then add areas that the Environment Ministry data suggests would have
been protected in 2008 to the areas the UN data indicates were protected in 2007.21
21Note, because the data are based on the same underlying sources, that the UN data indicates
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Thus, we are only using the data on current extent of protected areas for the most
recent few years, when the problem of new protected areas superseding old ones
is relatively small.
A.3 Land Use Patterns Classification
To study the effect of protection on permanent relative to temporary deforestation,
we need to consider land use for periods longer than one year. To begin with,
we categorise land use into three broad classes, Forested, Shrubland or Cropland
(as described in Section 3.3). We can then generate sequences of patterns that are
suggestive of either permanent deforestation and settled agriculture, temporary
deforestation (e.g. due to selective logging, or short term agriculture), or perma-
nent forest cover. For example, a pattern such as FSCCC suggests that an initially
forested coordinate was cleared and converted to cropland in the course of a five
year period. On the other hand, a pattern such as FSSFF, suggests that a coordi-
nate was temporarily cleared, with the forest regrowing. Clearly, the first pattern
suggests stationary land use by a farmer, while the second may indicate temporary
extraction of valuable timber.
In order to study patterns of land use, we need to categorise or group repeating
patterns into use clusters. Given that we have data for 12 years, we can create two
sets of such five letter series and categorise the resulting patterns into permanent
forest cover, temporary deforestation, or permanent deforestation, and then study,
how conservation changes this pattern. The resulting state space S = {F, S, C} ×
...× {F, S, C} can have at most 35 = 243 different series; the data almost exhausts
the state space, with 242 distinct series.
The idea is to group series together into dominant clusters. This could be done
manually, but would likely be very subjective from case to case. In order to arrive at
an objective grouping, we apply a powerful tool from machine learning: k-means
clustering.
K-means clustering solves a simple optimisation problem, assigning observa-
tions to clusters C1, ..., CK, such that the total within-cluster variation is minimised,
is protected is a superset of that indicated by the Environment Brazilian Data—it is all the areas
still protected by the same park in 2014 plus the areas where the identity of the protected area had
changed, but protection status did not.
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i.e.
min
C1,...,Ck
K
∑
k=1
W(Ck)
where
W(Ck) = ∑
i∈Ck
p
∑
j=1
(xij − x¯kj)2
For a given number of clusters K, the solution is an assignment of data coordi-
nates xi to clusters C1, ..., CK, which maximises intra-cluster homogeneity and min-
imises inter-cluster similarity. There exist very fast implementations of K-means
clustering algorithms in statistical programming packages, which provide a local
approximation to the above optimisation problem. These algorithms are guaran-
teed to converge to a local optimum; performing multiple iterations with different
initial conditions ensures that the routine does not converge to a particularly bad
local optimum.
In order to separate the data, we need to extract numeric information from
the five character length series, which may be informative about the underlying
transitions and land use patterns. We construct eight numeric variables: Number
of transitions to state F, number of transitions from state F to some other state, the
number of times the coordinate is in state F, an indicator for whether the series
is ever in state C, the number of times the coordinate is in state S, the number of
repeating non F states and the number of repeating F states, as well as the length
of repeating pairs (to capture regularity e.g. in patterns such as SCSCS).
As noted, the number K is a choice and, mechanically, larger values of K im-
prove the fit (for K = n, each observation would be its own cluster and the ob-
jective function would be minimal at zero). In order to estimate the total number
of clusters, we perform the statistical test described by Tibshirani et al. (2001),
which computes a measure of goodness of clustering. The idea of the test is sim-
ple: for every number of clusters k it computes the gap between the expected
value of the objective function and the actual, f (k) = E∗[log(W(k))]− log(W(k)),
where E∗[log(W(k))] is obtained via bootstrapping. A large value of f (k) indi-
cates that we are overfitting the data. As a decision criterion for the optimal
number K∗, Tibshirani et al. (2001) propose to choose the smallest k such that
f (k) ≥ f (k+ 1)− se( fk+1). This choice effectively requires that the improvement in
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the sum of the within cluster variations for k clusters needs to within one standard
deviation of the increase that is expected with k + 1 clusters
Throughout, we see that the optimal number of clusters is K = 6. Table A7
below provides details over how well the clustering performs in terms of separating
five letter sequences into dominant clusters based on the measures xi. Clusters 1
through 3 can clearly be interpreted as permanent deforestation clusters; they will
have, at any point, been assigned a status of being cropped and their sequence
is dominated by repetitions of states S and C. Cluster 4 could arguably capture
permanent or temporary deforestation. The dominant states are F and S, with the
state C being rarely observed. Cluster 5 has a significant number of transitions to
and from states F, consistent with periodic temporary deforestation. Cluster 6 is
clearly permanently forested, with very rare instances of coordinates transitioning
from F to C state. Table A8 presents the most common five letter sequences and
their respective overall or within cluster shares.
As mentioned, it is not clear whether temporary or permanent deforestation
is the best way to describe the sequences in cluster 4. In the baseline table we
classify it as ‘permanent deforestation’ (the broad definition of permanent defor-
estation). However, the results are robust to classifying it as temporary deforesta-
tion (the broad definition of temporary deforestation), or as neither permanent or
temporary deforestation (the narrow definition of both temporary and permanent
deforestation). Table A13 contains these results.
B Description of Additional Robustness Checks
B.1 Robustness to allowing for fiscal transfers are made on the
basis of ecological services.
Some states use a small proportion of ICMS (Value Added Tax) revenues to com-
pensate municipalities for the loss of land set aside for environmental protection.
Of the nine Amazon states, five currently apportion revenues some revenues in
this way.22 For three of these states, Acre (2010), Tocantins (2003) and Mato Grosso
22The states that currently make transfers of this type are Acre, Tocantins, Mato Grosso, Rondonia
and Amapa. So it is Amazonas, Roraima, Maranhao and Para that do not.
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(2002), the transfers were introduced within the time period we study. If trans-
fers are made, the size and distribution of the pot varies depending on state law.
Rondonia and Mato Grosso currently make the largest provision, with 5% of ICMS
revenues remitted to municipalities primarily on the basis of protected area. Even
within these states, for most municipalities the amount at stake is small: in Mato
Grosso in 2009, these transfers account for around 1% of municipal revenue and in
84% of municipalities these transfers are less than 5% of revenue.23 Given the large
stock of existing protected areas, we think it unlikely that the variation in protected
areas exploited by this study had a substantial effect on either local public finances
or services. Our main analysis thus includes data from all of the Amazon region.
Nevertheless, to mitigate concerns over endogenous municipal budgets, we un-
dertake two exercises. In Table A4 Panel A, we repeat our panel analysis but
include a control which proxies for the value of transfers. Specifically, for each
municipality-year we calculate the share of protected land in the state which is in
the municipality and interact this with the share of state level ICMS revenues that
the state remits on the basis of ecological service provided. The coefficients on our
main variable of interest are robust to the inclusion of this control. If anything,
higher transfers seem to be associated with more violence not less, although given
the scale of our proxy for transfers the economic significance of these findings is
limited. In Table A4 Panel B, we repeat our quasi-event study analysis omitting
protected areas which any part of fall in a state that ever provide transfers. The
results are very similar to those estimated on the full sample.
B.2 Robustness to controlling for INCRA activity
Alston et al. (1999, 2000) persuasively argue that the presence of INCRA activity
is an important factor in facilitating land conflict. As the body responsible for ex-
propriating landowners on behalf of settlers, INCRA are a key contributor to weak
property rights in Brazil. Consequently, if INCRA activity tended to be located
far from protected areas, our results could be picking up the pacifying effects of
a lack of INCRA activity, rather than that of secure assignment of property rights
23Author’s calculations based on official data from the Brazilian Institute for Geography and
Statistics (IBGE) and the State Government of Mato Grosso.
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represented by the expansion of protected areas.
To test this, we obtained digital maps of the location of INCRA land reform
settlements. As a proxy for INCRA activity, we produced the share of the surface
of a municipality that was under INCRA settlement for each year in our data. We
distinguish between INCRA settlements inside and outside protected areas. In our
panel specification, we include these INCRA land shares as additional controls. In
our event study specification, we drop protected areas that intersect with INCRA
areas at any time.
Table A6 contains the results. In neither case are our main coefficients of interest
significantly affected. There is, however, suggestive evidence that more INCRA
activity is associated with higher levels of violence—as found by Alston et al.—but
only when the INCRA settlements are not inside protected areas.
B.3 Robustness of land use change results
There are at least two concerns that arise from the semi-supervised clustering of
the land use sequences and the subsequent study of patterns of land use change.
First, there is some arbitrariness in terms of the chosen length of sequences that are
clustered into land use types. Second, the creation of longer land use sequences
creates a degree of arbitrariness in terms of the timing of protection status since
it is unclear whether to consider a sequence as treated in case it switched status
halfway through a five letter sequence. We address each of these concerns in turn.
Sequence Length and Clustering We perform clustering on slightly shorter se-
quences of length four, as well as clusters on sequences of length six. As in the main
example for sequences of length five, we perform determine the optimal number of
clusters using the test described in Tibshirani et al. (2001). Throughout, the statis-
tically optimal number of clusters as per the gap statistic test is six. We transform
the six resulting clusters into the three groups of sequences, forested, temporarily
deforested, permanently deforested, and perform the same analysis as in the main
table, relying on variation in the protection status coming from status changes be-
tween 2001 and 2009 for the four letter sequences and on status changes between
2001 and 2006 for the six letter sequences. The results are presented in Table A12
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and are consistent with the results presented in our main analysis. Our results are
robust to the choice of sequence length.
Treatment Timing As noted, we infer behavioural changes of settlers by studying
patterns of land use focusing on longer time series of land use patterns. This
creates a degree of arbitrariness in terms of the treatment timing. In the main table
we assign a coordinate as being protected if in the initial year of each five letter
sequence, it was classified as protected. Hence, the resulting variation in protection
status is coming from coordinates whose protection status changed between 2001
and 2008.
In table A14 we explore other treatment timings. Panel A presents the baseline
results. In Panel B, we narrow in by focusing on coordinates changing protection
status between 2003 and 2008. Panel C focus on coordinate changing protection sta-
tus between 2003 and 2010 and Panel D exploits the maximal variation by focusing
coordinates changing status between 2001 (first year) and 2010 (last year).
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Table A1: Robustness to Alternative Panel Specifications
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Municipality FE + Time FE
Protected Share -0.113 -0.079*** -0.051*** 0.208
(0.113) (0.026) (0.018) (0.138)
B. Municipality FE + State-by-Time FE
Protected Share -0.208 -0.071** -0.047** -0.183
(0.139) (0.035) (0.020) (0.172)
C. Municipality FE + Time FE + Municipality Trends
Protected Share -0.656** -0.195** -0.111*** 0.018
(0.286) (0.090) (0.043) (0.132)
D. Municipality FE + State-by-Time FE + Municipality Trends
Protected Share -0.556** -0.151* -0.088** -0.033
(0.265) (0.085) (0.038) (0.133)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions on different out-
come measures reflecting land related conflict in the Brazilian Ama-
zon region. The data is a municipal level balanced panel of conflict
data. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A2: Ecological and Indigenous Protected Areas Have a Similar Effect
on Violence
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Quasi-Event: Indigenous Protected Areas Only
Protected Share -0.700** -0.199** -0.123* -0.484**
(0.333) (0.091) (0.064) (0.218)
Mean of DV .334 .0864 .0418 .334
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68
Municipalities 154 154 154 154
Protected Areas 114 114 114 114
Observations 4284 4284 4284 4284
B. Quasi-Event: Ecologically Protected Areas Only
Protected Share -0.518* -0.116 -0.073** -1.036***
(0.307) (0.073) (0.031) (0.229)
Mean of DV .329 .109 .0527 .475
Municipalities per Protected Area 3.34 3.34 3.34 3.34
Municipalities 195 195 195 195
Protected Areas 95 95 95 95
Observations 4438 4438 4438 4438
Protected Area x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area x Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period
1997-2010 using the quasi-event study specification as in Panel B of table 2. The differ-
ence here is that in Panel A, we restrict the set of protected areas which are established
for the purpose for protecting indigenous lands, while in Panel B, we restrict only to
environmentally protected areas. Due to the relatively small number of strictly protected
areas established, it is not possible to break down ecologically protected areas by type.
Standard errors two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area levels with
stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A3: Robustness: Quasi-Event Alternative Definition of Protected Share
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
Protected Share of Hitherto Unprotected Land -0.358* -0.120** -0.070** -0.543***
(0.185) (0.054) (0.032) (0.138)
Mean of DV .33 .0962 .0465 .39
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.92 2.92 2.92 2.92
Municipalities 264 264 264 264
Protected Areas 199 199 199 199
Observations 8148 8148 8148 8148
Protected Area x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area x Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-2010 using
the quasi-event study specification as in Panel B of table 2. In that table, the variable of interest
was the share of all land in a municipality that is newly protected, here it is the share of land in
a municipality that was unprotected last year that is newly protected. Compared to the the main
results, this change in variable is expected to mechanically reduce the estimated coefficients, as the
rescaling increases the variance of our independent variable without affecting the variance of our
outcome. There are 574 fewer observations in this specification as we can no longer calculate the
share of land protected for protected areas established in 1997. Standard errors two-way clustered at
the municipality and protected area levels with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Robustness: Controlling for Ecological Transfers or Dropping
Protected Areas Affected by Them
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel: Control For Transfers
Protected Share -0.326* -0.097* -0.073*** -0.096
(0.172) (0.050) (0.027) (0.204)
Fiscal Transfers Proxy 0.065** 0.023 0.012 0.044**
(MSP × State Tax Share) (0.031) (0.014) (0.008) (0.018)
Municipal Share of State 0.789 0.061 0.209 -1.705
Protected Area (MSP) (1.512) (0.448) (0.197) (1.667)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Muncipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event: Drop Protected Areas That May Have Induced Ecological Transfers
Protected Share -0.707** -0.122* -0.085** -0.666***
(0.280) (0.069) (0.041) (0.168)
Mean of DV .463 .127 .0559 .418
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.92 2.92 2.92 2.92
Municipalities 147 147 147 147
Protected Areas 118 118 118 118
Observations 4816 4816 4816 4816
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel. The municipal level proxy for
fiscal transfers is the interaction between the municipal share of all of a states protected
land and the share of VAT revenues set aside for ecological transfers. Panel B uses the
quasi-event specification as in Panel B of table 2. The difference here is that protected
areas that have any of their land in states which had positive fiscal transfers at any point
during the sample are excluded. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level (panel
A) or two-way clustered at the municipality and protected area level (panel B) with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
52
Table A5: Robustness: Dropping Municipalities Which Were Ever Black-
listed for Excessive Deforestaion
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel: Dropping Blacklisted Municipalities
Protected Share -0.290** -0.060* -0.048** -0.250
(0.121) (0.033) (0.020) (0.171)
Mean of DV .125 .0289 .0165 .284
Observations 10402 10402 10402 10402
Municipalities 743 743 743 743
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event: Dropping Blacklisted Municipalities
Protected Share -0.521** -0.076 -0.064* -0.772***
(0.263) (0.052) (0.036) (0.195)
Mean of DV .104 .0298 .0157 .279
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96
Municipalities 244 244 244 244
Protected Areas 170 170 170 170
Observations 7056 7056 7056 7056
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel. We drop 50 municipalities that
from 2008 onwards were on a blacklist of municipalities due to bad performance in terms
of deforestation and environmental protection. Panel B uses the quasi-event specification
as in Panel B of table 2. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level (panel A) or two-
way clustered at the municipality and protected area level (panel B) with stars indicating
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A6: Robustness: Controlling for INCRA settlement expansion across
municipalities inside and outside of protected areas.
Aggregated Violence Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Escalation Violence Any Violence Disputes
A. Panel: Controlling for INCRA settlements
Protected Share -0.157 -0.066* -0.043** -0.240
(0.135) (0.035) (0.020) (0.214)
INCRA (and Unprotected) Share 0.458** 0.081 0.035 0.184
(0.230) (0.065) (0.028) (0.306)
INCRA (and Protected) Share -0.319 0.009 -0.013 1.177
(0.227) (0.066) (0.027) (1.499)
Mean of DV .173 .0452 .0241 .315
Observations 11088 11088 11088 11088
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Quasi-Event: Dropping events affected by INCRA settlements
Protected Share -0.497 -0.190** -0.150** -1.083***
(0.413) (0.080) (0.066) (0.370)
Mean of DV .201 .0558 .0299 .342
Municipalities per Protected Area 2.67 2.67 2.67 2.67
Municipalities 155 155 155 155
Protected Areas 96 96 96 96
Observations 3584 3584 3584 3584
Protected Area × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Protected Area × Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results obtained using data on municipal level violence covering the period 1997-
2010. Panel A provides results based on the full panel, controlling for the share of a
municipalities surface area that is dedicated to INCRA settlements lying inside or outside
of protected areas. Panel B performs the quasi-event specification as in Panel B of table 2,
with the exception that we remove individual protected area events that are in some way
affected by having (mostly very marginal) INCRA activity within them. Standard errors
clustered at the municipal level (panel A) or two-way clustered at the municipality and
protected area level (panel B) with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A7: K-Means Clusters and Separation on Features
Clustering Variables
Cluster Interpretation to F from F Ever C len(F) len(S) len(repeat S, C) len(repeat F) repeat pairs Freq
1 Permanent Deforestation 0.056 0.204 1.000 0.157 3.361 4.668 0.000 0.229 SC 1.4%
2 Permanent Deforestation 0.155 0.416 1.000 0.495 0.676 4.467 0.216 0.147 C 1.9%
3 Permanent Deforestation 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 5.000 5.000 0.000 0.000 S 20.5%
4 Permanent/Temporary 0.493 1.012 0.064 1.545 3.387 3.400 0.653 0.215 FS 0.7%
5 Temporary Deforestation 0.466 0.984 0.222 3.430 1.236 1.454 3.151 0.057 FS 1.1%
6 Forest 0.001 0.002 0.002 4.998 0.000 0.000 4.998 0.000 F 74.4%
Notes: Table presents the eight numeric features used to represent the landcover sequences of length five. The eight features are: the number
of transitions to state F, the number of transitions from F, whether the sequence was ever in state C, the overall length in state S, the length in
repeated non F states, the length of repeating F states and the length of repeating pairs. These features were used to separate the individual
sequences into six different clusters using the k-means clustering algorithm as implemented by Hartigan and Wong (1979). The table presents
the mean of each clustering variable indicated in the column head in the respective cluster. This allows an understanding of which features help
in separating the individual clusters.
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Table A8: K-Means Clusters and common class sequences
Cluster Interpretation Sequence Share within cluster Overall share N
1 Permanent Deforestation SSSSC 18.4% 0.8% 11081
1 Permanent Deforestation CSSSS 15.5% 0.6% 9344
1 Permanent Deforestation SSSCC 12.8% 0.5% 7699
1 Permanent Deforestation SSSCS 12.0% 0.5% 7219
1 Permanent Deforestation CCSSS 11.4% 0.5% 6864
1 Permanent Deforestation SCSSS 6.1% 0.3% 3677
1 Permanent Deforestation SSCSS 3.7% 0.2% 2226
1 Permanent Deforestation SCSCS 3.7% 0.2% 2206
1 Permanent Deforestation CSSSC 2.7% 0.1% 1649
1 Permanent Deforestation SSCCS 2.6% 0.1% 1585
2 Permanent Deforestation SSSSS 100.0% 20.5% 297609
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCCC 39.5% 1.9% 27451
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCSS 8.0% 0.4% 5537
3 Permanent Deforestation SSCCC 7.5% 0.4% 5216
3 Permanent Deforestation SCCCC 6.9% 0.3% 4785
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCCS 6.3% 0.3% 4413
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCSC 4.5% 0.2% 3161
3 Permanent Deforestation SCCCS 2.9% 0.1% 1991
3 Permanent Deforestation CCCFF 2.4% 0.1% 1691
3 Permanent Deforestation CSCSC 2.3% 0.1% 1604
3 Permanent Deforestation CSCCC 2.3% 0.1% 1585
4 Permanent/Temporary FSSSS 20.8% 0.4% 5474
4 Permanent/Temporary FFSSS 16.8% 0.3% 4413
4 Permanent/Temporary SSSSF 15.8% 0.3% 4163
4 Permanent/Temporary SSSFF 11.3% 0.2% 2957
4 Permanent/Temporary SSSFS 5.2% 0.1% 1374
4 Permanent/Temporary FSSSF 4.0% 0.1% 1053
4 Permanent/Temporary FSFSF 3.2% 0.1% 830
4 Permanent/Temporary SFSSS 3.0% 0.1% 775
4 Permanent/Temporary SSFSS 2.9% 0.1% 760
4 Permanent/Temporary SSFSF 2.3% 0.0% 598
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFSS 18.3% 0.6% 8153
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFFS 16.5% 0.5% 7351
5 Temporary Deforestation SFFFF 11.2% 0.3% 4997
5 Temporary Deforestation SSFFF 7.5% 0.2% 3360
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFSF 7.0% 0.2% 3111
5 Temporary Deforestation CCFFF 4.8% 0.1% 2143
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFCC 4.1% 0.1% 1814
5 Temporary Deforestation FSFFF 4.1% 0.1% 1804
5 Temporary Deforestation FFSFF 2.2% 0.1% 977
5 Temporary Deforestation FFFSC 1.9% 0.1% 848
6 Forest FFFFF 99.5% 74.4% 1081436
6 Forest CFFFF 0.2% 0.2% 2605
6 Forest FFFFC 0.2% 0.1% 2090
6 Forest FFCFF 0.0% 0.0% 271
Notes: Table presents the results from performing k-means clustering on landcover
sequences of length five. The optimal number of clusters as determined using the
gap statistic test in Tibshirani et al. (2001) is six. The ten (or less in case there are
fewer than 10 sequences types per cluster) most frequent sequences that comprise
each cluster and their respective share within and across the clusters is provided.
We interpret the six clustered sequences as being either Forest, Temporary Defor-
estation or Permanent Deforestation.
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Table A9: Matching Regression: Where Gets Protected?
Change in Protected Status Between 2001 and 2010 Dummy
(1)
ln(KM to River + 1) -0.067*
(0.035)
ln(KM to Road + 1) 0.124
(0.080)
Mean Elevation -0.000
(0.000)
Var Elevation 0.015**
(0.007)
Longitude (x) -0.125***
(0.029)
Latitude (y) -0.064*
(0.034)
ln(GAEZ Yield Cassava +1) 0.464
(1.386)
ln(GAEZ Yield Maize +1) 0.036
(0.416)
ln(GAEZ Yield Wetland Rice +1) 1.772
(1.811)
ln(GAEZ Yield Soybean +1) 0.449
(0.510)
ln(GAEZ Yield Oil Palm +1) -0.072***
(0.025)
ln(GAEZ Yield Dryland Rice +1) 0.476
(0.607)
ln(max{GAEZ Yield x Price} +1) 2.064***
(0.601)
Annual Temperature Average -0.042
(0.038)
Annual Rainfall Average -0.000
(0.000)
Annual Rainfall Standard Deviation 0.002*
(0.001)
Distance to Nightlights 0.092***
(0.015)
(Distance to Nightlights)2 -0.001***
(0.000)
Forested (MODIS) 0.313***
(0.084)
Shrubland (MODIS) 0.190*
(0.109)
Cropland (MODIS) -0.127
(0.148)
N 791406
Meso Region Dummies Yes
Notes: Results from a probit regression. Outcome is a dummy indicating whether the protection status
changed between 2001 and 2010. These changes are all changes from ‘unprotected’ status to ‘protected’
status. Propensity scores obtained from this regression used to construct the matched panel. Each
observation is a randomly drawn coordinate within the Amazon states. Distances are straight-line
distances to the nearest river (Natural Earth V. 3), national highway in 2001 (algorithmically generated
based on maps and descriptions obtained from DNIT) and night-lights in 1999-2001 (from DMSP).
Initial land cover from MODIS. Mean and Variance of elevation from GMTED. Yields are obtained from
the FAO’s GAEZ database which provides theoretical yields for a range of crops based on agronomic
models and geographic inputs. Climatic variable are from MOD11A1 Land surface and CHIRPS for
rainfall. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A10: Protection and Changes in Forest Cover: Ro-
bustness to other propensity score cutoffs
Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (3)
A. Propensity score < 0.1
Newly Protected 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.011***
Between 2001 and 2010 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
N 253836 253737 253836 253642
Mean of DV -.00484 -.00482 -.00484 -.00483
B. Propensity score < 0.01
Newly Protected 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.014***
Between 2001 and 2010 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
N 198768 198669 198768 198574
Mean of DV -.0059 -.00587 -.0059 -.00589
C. Propensity score < 0.001
Newly Protected 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.014***
Between 2001 and 2010 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
N 159848 159749 159848 159654
Mean of DV -.00602 -.00598 -.00602 -.006
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes
in protected status to changes forest cover. The data is a random
sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Amazon. The
outcome variable is a categorical variable indicating whether the
coordinate was reforested (1), deforested (-1), or had no change in
forest cover status (0). Coordinates which were protected between
2001 and 2010 are matched to observationally identical coordinates
that were either never protected or always protected on the basis of
propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9 for the matching
regression). We retain only matched pairs with absolute differences
in propensity score less than indicated. Our baseline matched sam-
ple results were calculated with a propensity score cutoff of 0.001.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Stars indi-
cating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A11: Protection and Changes in Land Use Pat-
terns: Robustness to propensity score cutoffs
Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def.
A. Propensity score < 0.1
Newly Protected 0.003 0.004** -0.007**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
N 253627 253627 253627
Mean of DV -.00251 -.00287 .00538
B. Propensity score < 0.01
Newly Protected 0.003 0.005** -0.008**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
N 198575 198575 198575
Mean of DV -.00322 -.00349 .00671
C. Propensity score < 0.0001
Newly Protected 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
N 159660 159660 159660
Mean of DV -.00319 -.0042 .0074
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating
changes in protected status to changes in land use sequence type.
The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the
Brazilian Amazon. Two five year sequences are used for each co-
ordinate, 2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land use sequences are
categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporarily defor-
ested and permanently deforested, using the approach described
in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable which
takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular
classification. The independent variable indicates whether the
coordinate was protected between 2001 and 2008 (the first year
of each five year sequence). Coordinates which were protected
between 2001 and 2010 are matched to observationally identical
coordinates that were either never protected or always protected
on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9
for the matching regression). We retain only matched pairs with
absolute differences in propensity score of less than indicated.
We match on changes between 2001 and 2010 for consistency
with table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A12: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns: Robustness to the choice
of sequence length
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def. Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def.
A. Sequence of length 6
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.009*** -0.017*** 0.006 0.002 -0.008**
Between 2001 and 2007 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0117 -.0107 .0224 -.00418 -.00291 .00708
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
B. Sequence of length 4
Newly Protected 0.009** 0.007*** -0.014*** 0.006 0.003 -0.009**
Between 2001 and 2009 (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0155 -.00823 .0213 -.00325 -.00392 .00612
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes in protected status to changes
in land use sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian
Amazon. We use two sequences of land use for each coordinate. In panel A, these are 2001-2006
and 2007-2012, in panel B these are 2001-2004 and 2009-2012. The land use sequences are categorised
into three groups, stable forest, temporarily deforested and permanently deforested, using the ap-
proach described in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable which takes the difference
between dummies indicating a particular classification. The independent variable is a dummy indicat-
ing whether a coordinate was protected. In columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between
2001 and 2010 are matched to observationally identical coordinates that were either never protected
or always protected on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9 for the matching
regression). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Stars indicating *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
60
Table A13: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns: Robustness to narrow and
broad definitions of temporary and permanent deforestation
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def. Forested Temp. Def. Perm Def.
A. Narrow Temporary Deforestation, Broad Permanent Deforestation
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0226 -.00313 -.00412 .00725
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
B. Broad Temporary Deforestation, Narrow Permanent Deforestation
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.006*** -0.014*** 0.003 0.006* -0.009**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.00854 .0208 -.00313 -.00332 .00646
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
C. Narrow Temporary Deforestation, Narrow Permanent Deforestation
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.014*** 0.003 0.005** -0.009**
Between 2001 and 2008 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0208 -.00313 -.00412 .00646
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating changes protected status to changes in land
use sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Amazon.
Two five year sequences are used for each coordinate, 2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land use se-
quences are categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporarily deforested and permanently de-
forested, using the approach described in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical variable which
takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular classification. The different panels use
either the broad or narrow definitions of forested and temporary deforestation. The independent
variable is a dummy indicating whether a coordinate was protected between 2001 and 2008 (the first
year of each sequence). In columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010
are matched to observationally identical coordinates that were either never protected or always pro-
tected on the basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9 for the matching regression).
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table A14: Protection and Changes in Land Use Patterns: Robustness to the
choice of treatment timing
Full Sample Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def. Forested Temp. Def. Perm. Def.
2001-2008
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.003 0.005** -0.008*
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
2001-2010
Newly Protected 0.008** 0.008*** -0.016*** 0.004 0.005** -0.009**
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
2003-2008
Newly Protected 0.011** 0.008*** -0.019*** 0.002 0.004* -0.006
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
2003-2010
Newly Protected 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.018*** 0.002 0.004* -0.006
Between Years (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Mean of DV -.0123 -.0103 .0226 -.00313 -.00412 .00725
N 792317 792317 792317 167147 167147 167147
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Matched Sample Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from OLS regressions relating protected status to changes in land
use sequence type. The data is a random sample of 793,928 coordinates across the Brazilian Ama-
zon. Two five year sequences are used for each coordinate, 2001-2005 and 2008-2012. The land
use sequences are categorised into three groups, stable forest, temporarily deforested and perma-
nently deforested, using the approach described in A.3. The dependent variable is a categorical
variable which takes the difference between dummies indicating a particular classification. The
independent variable indicates whether the coordinate was protected between the years indi-
cated. For columns 4-6, coordinates which were protected between 2001 and 2010 are matched to
observationally identical coordinates that were either never protected or always protected on the
basis of propensity scores (see Online Appendix Table A9 for the matching regression). We retain
only matched pairs with absolute differences in propensity score of less than 0.001. We match on
changes between 2001 and 2010 for consistency with table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
62
Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC)
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Web: www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk
